Christopher Young v. Jose Boggio by unknown
2019 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-30-2019 
Christopher Young v. Jose Boggio 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019 
Recommended Citation 
"Christopher Young v. Jose Boggio" (2019). 2019 Decisions. 909. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2019/909 
This September is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in 2019 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
ALD-280        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 






CHRISTOPHER YOUNG,  




JOSE BOGGIO; ROBERT MAXA; JERI SMOCK; ALEXIS SECARA;  
DANIEL STROUP; JOSEPH SILVA; MICHAEL CLARK; ANDREA NORRIS; 
CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS; JOHN WETZEL 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1:17-cv-00125) 
Magistrate Judge: Honorable Richard A. Lanzillo 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
September 12, 2019 
Before: McKEE, SHWARTZ, and BIBAS, Circuit Judges  
 







Christopher Young appeals the dismissal of his civil rights action for failure to state 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent.  
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a claim. Because this case does not present a substantial question, we will summarily af-
firm. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6. 
Young brought suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of his Eighth 
Amendment rights while he was incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Albion 
(“SCI Albion”). Young named multiple defendants, who fell into two categories: the med-
ical personnel that treated Young (the “Medical Defendants”)1 and the various administra-
tive staff of the Department of Corrections (“DoC Defendants”).2 Young generally alleged 
that the Medical Defendants deprived him of necessary medical care, while the DoC De-
fendants did nothing to intervene despite their alleged awareness of Young’s serious med-
ical needs. Both sets of defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In response, Young filed a motion for summary judgment. 
The Magistrate Judge ultimately granted both motions to dismiss.3 With regard to 
the Medical Defendants, the Magistrate Judge thoroughly detailed the various medical 
treatments and medications administered during the one-year period described in Young’s 
amended complaint. Young underwent a colonoscopy, endoscopy, ultrasound, and a CAT 
scan in an attempt to diagnose the source of his symptoms, which revealed that he had a 
                                              
1 These defendants included prison physicians Jose Boggio and Robert Maxa, physician 
assistants Alexis Secara and Daniel Stroup, and Correct Care Solutions (“CCS”). 
 
2 These defendants consisted of Superintendent Michael Clark, Correctional Health Care 
Administrator Jeri Smock, Bureau of Healthcare Services Directors Andrea Norris and Jo-
seph Silva, and Secretary of the Department of Corrections John Wetzel. 
 





mild form of erosive reflux and related disorders. The Medical Defendants treated Young’s 
symptoms with various medications, and even gave Young the option to select his own 
medications when he felt his previous medications were ineffective. The Magistrate Judge 
held that Young could not maintain an Eighth Amendment claim because there was no 
question that Young had received medical care to address his symptoms, and the mere 
dissatisfaction with that care was not actionable under the Eighth Amendment. To the ex-
tent Young alleged that Dr. Boggio may have been motivated by non-medical reasons in 
delaying treatment of Young with Carafate, a drug Young insisted on, the Magistrate Judge 
held that Dr. Boggio’s treatment of Young was not clearly inadequate. Indeed, the Magis-
trate Judge determined that Dr. Boggio treated Young with a host of medications (including 
Carafate), and the decision to attempt other medications (and delay the use of Carafate) 
was medically based on the fact that Young did not have ulcers of the stomach.4 
As to the DoC Defendants, the Magistrate Judge held that non-physician prison of-
ficials allegedly failing to directly respond to a prisoner’s medical complaints are not de-
liberately indifferent to that prisoner’s medical needs when that prisoner is already in the 
care of the prison’s physicians. Additionally, the Magistrate Judge noted that supervisory 
officials must play an affirmative part in the complained-of misconduct and further deter-
mined that Young’s allegations were based on the DoC Defendants’ roles in the grievance 
process, which is insufficient to demonstrate actual knowledge. Accordingly, the 
                                              
4 Similarly, the District Court determined that Dr. Maxa’s refusal to immediately prescribe 
Carafate to Young amounted to nothing more than a disagreement between an inmate and 




Magistrate Judge granted both motions to dismiss and denied Young’s motion for summary 
judgment. Young timely appealed. 
We have jurisdiction over the appeal of the Magistrate Judge’s judgment. See 28 
U.S.C. §§ 636(c)(3), 1291. We review the grant of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6) de novo. Newark Cab Ass’n v. City of Newark, 901 F.3d 146, 151 (3d Cir. 2018). 
“[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations, taken as true, to ‘state a claim 
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Fleisher v. Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). We accept all 
factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe those facts in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiff. Id. 
We agree with the Magistrate Judge that Young failed to allege an Eighth Amend-
ment claim against either group of defendants. As to the Medical Defendants, Young failed 
to allege that they were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Young did not allege—nor could he—that he was refused medical 
care or treatment. See Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 535 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(“[T]here is a critical distinction ‘between cases where the complaint alleges a complete 
denial of medical care and those alleging inadequate medical treatment.’” (quoting United 
States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette County, 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 1979) (per cu-
riam))). To the contrary, as mentioned above and more thoroughly detailed in the Magis-
trate Judge’s opinion, Young was seen numerous times by the Medical Defendants, given 
various medical tests, and prescribed medication to address his medical problems. Not only 
is there nothing to suggest that the treatment methods employed by the Medical Defendants 
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violated professional standards of care, Young’s allegations of dissatisfaction with that 
treatment will not support an Eighth Amendment claim. See id. (“Because ‘mere disagree-
ment as to the proper medical treatment’ does not ‘support a claim of an [E]ighth [A]mend-
ment violation,’ when medical care is provided, we presume that the treatment of a prisoner 
is proper absent evidence that it violates professional standards of care.” (citation omitted) 
(quoting Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346 (3d Cir. 
1987))). Furthermore, with regard to Dr. Boggio’s alleged budgetary motivations in delay-
ing the prescription of Carafate, we agree with the Magistrate Judge that Young’s own 
amended complaint undercuts this allegation, as it describes the medical reasoning behind 
the delay. See id.; Am. Compl. ¶ 19. Consequently, the Magistrate Judge properly dis-
missed the claims against the Medical Defendants.5 
The Magistrate Judge also correctly dismissed the claims against the DoC Defend-
ants, as it is undisputed that Young was receiving medical care from medical professionals 
at SCI Albion. See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that if an 
inmate is under the care of medical experts, “non-medical prison official[s] [like DoC De-
fendants] will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands”). 
Young failed to adequately allege the DoC Defendants had the requisite knowledge needed 
to maintain a deliberate indifference claim. See id. (“[A]bsent a reason to believe (or actual 
knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a 
                                              
5 For the reasons thoroughly detailed in the Magistrate Judge’s opinion, we also agree that 
Young failed to allege that CCS, the entity under contract to provide health care services 
at SCI Albion, had a policy or custom that directly caused him constitutional harm. See 
Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 583–84 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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prisoner, . . . non-medical prison official[s] like [DoC Defendants] will not be chargeable 
with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.”). Moreover, 
the Magistrate Judge correctly determined that Young failed to allege the requisite personal 
involvement needed to maintain a § 1983 claim against the DoC Defendants. See Evancho 
v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting that supervisory liability cannot be 
predicated solely on respondeat superior and finding an amended complaint failed to allege 
facts that, if proven, would show personal involvement in alleged wrongdoing). 
Finally, the Magistrate Judge did not err in dismissing the complaint without provid-
ing Young an opportunity to further amend, because, as his amended complaint demon-
strates, amendment would have been futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 
103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm 
the Magistrate Judge’s judgment. In light of our disposition, Young’s pending motion for 
appointment of counsel is denied as moot. 
